

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00606R000200180002-2

TCM 75-25

C 1 of 1
TCM 75-25

Trends in Communist Media

25 Jun 75

~~Confidential~~

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

25 JUNE 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 25)

This report is based exclusively on foreign media materials and is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by 000073
Automatic: declassified
5.2 months from date of issue



CONTENTS

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

TASS Head Defends Arms Talks, Elucidates Brezhnev's Proposal. . . 1

PRC-U.S.-USSR

Peking Assesses U.S. Gains in World Competition With Soviets. . . 3

VIETNAM

Hanoi Paper Scores Kissinger Speech on U.S. Asian Policies. . . . 6

Correction to 18 June TRENDS Article on Role of PRG 8

MIDDLE EAST

USSR Speculates on Outcome of U.S. Talks With Arabs, Israel . . . 9

EAST EUROPE

Romanians Register Satisfaction With Results of Zhivkov Visit . . 13

LATIN AMERICA

Communist Party Conference Stresses "Firm Unity," Attacks PRC . . 16

USSR

Mazurov, Kirilenko Again Diverge on Economic Priorities 19

NOTES

Pyongyang on Schlesinger; Peking on USSR-Japan;
PRC-U.S.-Taiwan; Peking South Asia Broadcasts;
Phnom Penh Radio on Sihanouk. 22

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics 1

- 1 -

U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

TASS HEAD DEFENDS ARMS TALKS, ELUCIDATES BREZHNEV PROPOSAL

A recent defense of the USSR's current arms negotiations with the United States by TASS' general director and Soviet media discussions of a current Washington emphasis on further increasing U.S. military power suggest that the question of how much Moscow has gained to date in the arms negotiations remains a sensitive point for Soviet policymakers. TASS General Director Leonid Zamyatin joined a regular Moscow radio panel discussion of foreign affairs on 20 June to defend the arms negotiations with the United States and shed a little light on the new arms control proposal made recently by General Secretary Brezhnev. Zamyatin was responding to listeners who had written to express puzzlement over why the USSR continued to talk with the United States about limiting arms while U.S. policy continued to emphasize the desirability of further increases in military might.

Zamyatin defended the success of U.S.-Soviet efforts in isolating and effectively limiting certain aspects of the arms race, emphasizing that the USSR did not adhere to a policy of "all or nothing" in arms control negotiations. Brezhnev had first taken issue with unnamed advocates of an "all or nothing" policy in negotiations with the West in a September 1973 speech at Tashkent. Zamyatin's defense of the U.S.-Soviet arms talks is only the latest of such efforts since then.

The panel in which Zamyatin was participating expressed its concern over recent directions in U.S. defense policy. Soviet media have focused renewed criticism on Western arms developments in the wake of Brezhnev's 8 May V-E Day address reasserting the impossibility of an indefinite coexistence of "international detente and a constant increase in the military potential of nations" and the joint Soviet party-government appeal issued the next day calling for new steps to limit the "arms race in all its forms." Commentaries have been particularly critical of recent statements by Defense Secretary Schlesinger on the need for improvements in NATO's arsenal and of the emphasis on NATO's nuclear potential reflected in the results of the mid-June meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Monterey, California. Soviet leaders had expressed their own concern over the thrust of recent statements on defense policy by U.S. leaders in the republic Supreme Soviet election campaign which ended with Brezhnev's address on 13 June.

- 2 -

BREZHNEV ARMS
PROPOSAL

Zamyatin also offered an opinion on what type of weapon Brezhnev may have had in mind in urging a ban on "new categories of mass destruction weapons" in his 13 June election speech. The TASS director gave as an example alleged U.S. research on "superbombs" which kill by the emission of electromagnetic radiation "such as X-rays and gamma-rays" but without the attendant dispersion of radioactive material. Some Moscow reports of reaction to Brezhnev's speech in Europe and the United States have quoted without comment speculation that he was referring specifically to military applications of environmental modification. The 15 June PRAVDA quoted an observation by the New York TIMES that the Brezhnev proposal "could figure at the Soviet-U.S. SALT talks which will resume in Geneva this month."

- 3 -

P R C - U. S. - U S S R

PEKING ASSESSES U.S. GAINS IN WORLD COMPETITION WITH SOVIETS

Peking's first comprehensive assessment of the international "super-power" competition between the United States and the Soviet Union since U.S. setbacks early this spring in the Middle East and Indochina portrays the United States as bouncing back and holding the upper hand over the USSR. The assessment was offered in a lengthy 16 June Peking domestic radio program on current international events which focused on U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the March stalemate of Secretary Kissinger's Middle East mediation efforts and the April collapse of U.S.-sponsored regimes in Cambodia and Vietnam.

New elements in the Peking assessment included the view that the Soviet-U.S. competition in Europe has reached a "new stage" as the United States solidifies its relations with its West European allies in opposition to alleged Soviet expansionism there, a Peking claim for the first time that the United States has regained the initiative over Moscow in the Middle East, and Peking comment hailing the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina and its continued firm stand against the USSR in the Asia-Pacific region.

In recent months Peking had originated little comment on U.S.-Soviet rivalry, instead relying on extensive NCNA replays of third-party comment expressing encouragement to the United States to exploit the "opportunity" offered by its withdrawal from such "secondary" areas as Indochina in order to concentrate on blocking the USSR in "more vital" areas such as Europe and the Middle East.*

EUROPE Peking's new assessment cited as evidence of the "new stage" in U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Europe the "new circumstances" and "new trends" in the region. The commentary noted that in the past Moscow had taken advantage of Washington's "over-extended" international efforts to expand its own influence in Europe, but that the recent U.S. withdrawal from Indochina had allowed the United States to unite more closely with its European allies to counter Soviet designs. Following the U.S. "failure in Indochina," the commentary stated, "the United States was able to pull out of there, shorten its line of operations and concentrate its strength on the principal area of contention with Soviet revisionism."

* For an example of NCNA use of foreign comment interpreting President Ford's European trip as the first step in a major U.S. diplomatic offensive in Europe and the Middle East, see the TRENDS of 4 June 1975, pages 6-7.

- 4 -

Peking viewed as especially disquieting to the USSR the recent U.S. efforts to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance during the NATO summit, and it noted increased Western resistance to Moscow's efforts to promote the European Security Conference and to undercut West European unity. The comment cited as recent evidence of a newly developing U.S.-West European unity and strength against alleged Soviet expansionism President Ford's visits to Spain and Italy, the talks between Turkish and Greek leaders, reaffirmations of ties with NATO by French and Portuguese leaders, the results of the British referendum on the EC, and Greece's formal request to join the Common Market.

MIDDLE EAST Peking noted that Moscow had attempted to gain influence at U.S. expense in the Middle East following the collapse of U.S.-sponsored mediation efforts in March, but claimed that "the going has not been very smooth" for the USSR, its "impact has not been impressive," and its efforts to "meddle" under the cover of the Geneva peace conference have "met considerable resistance." "Not much progress has been made toward improving Soviet revisionism's passive position in its contest with the United States in the Middle East," the commentary added.

By contrast, Peking saw the United States as having successfully "readjusted" its Middle East policy and mapped out a "new strategy" to strengthen its hand against Moscow. It highlighted President Ford's recent talks with Egyptian President as-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, and claimed that "public opinion in the West" judges that "the United States has once again gained the initiative in the Middle East and has the edge over its adversary in its contention with Soviet revisionism."*

SOUTHEAST ASIA While Peking acknowledged that the U.S. position in Southeast Asia has become "increasingly weak and strategically passive" in the wake of its Indochina defeat, it has favorably played up recent signs of U.S. determination to sustain

* Following the successful U.S. mediation efforts in 1974, Peking had consistently portrayed the United States as having the "upper hand" against Moscow in the Middle East, but the Chinese fell silent on the issue after the March 1975 collapse of Kissinger's mediation efforts. An unusual NCNA report in March had depicted Moscow gaining ground as a result of the U.S. failure, but the report was quickly cancelled by NCNA and replaced by another report which depicted neither power as in a dominant position. This unusual NCNA handling is discussed in the TRENDS of 26 March 1975, pages 4-5.

- 5 -

its interests against Soviet expansion. The commentary reported that Washington has been compelled to "readjust its strategic deployment," and noted favorably that "it is reluctant to abandon its interests in this region." The commentary also acknowledged for the first time Assistant Secretary of State Habib's recent tour of Southeast Asia, viewing it as evidence of U.S. determination to maintain its position as an "Asian and Pacific country" and to play "its deserved and responsible role for the sake of the interests of the United States and this region." By contrast, the Soviet Union was portrayed negatively as the main menace to Southeast Asian states and as trying hard "to replace the United States and dominate Asia."

Peking earlier had indicated support for a post-Indochina U.S. Asian presence to offset the USSR by giving unusually full NCNA rerortage to favorable U.S. comment on the U.S. Navy's Indian Ocean presence and base at Diego Garcia. Peking has also favorably reported the New Zealand Prime Minister's recent ringing endorsement of the ANZUS pact with the United States, and has maintained silence on other U.S. security pacts in the area, while sharply denouncing Soviet attempts to attain hegemony there.

- 6 -

VIETNAM

Secretary of State Kissinger's 18 June speech focusing on U.S. policies in Asia has drawn only low-level media criticism from Hanoi. An unattributed commentary, published in the party paper NHAN DAN on 21 June, charged that the Secretary's remarks demonstrated the United States has not drawn the necessary lessons from Indochina and continues to follow a "neocolonialist" policy of intervention in Asia. Other Hanoi comment also condemned the U.S. role in the region, including a 22 June commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN which took exception to Washington's contention that Southeast Asian nations believe North Vietnam has expansionist tendencies and are concerned that Hanoi may foment subversion in the area. The paper maintained that "the people of Southeast Asia, including many governments," are recognizing the mutual advantages of improving relations with Vietnam.

In the past few days there has been a reduction in monitored material on the situation in South Vietnam as a result of an unexplained interruption of radio transmissions originating in Saigon. The Saigon radio failed to come on the air with its scheduled 1100 GMT program on 23 June and has since been heard only twice in unscheduled broadcasts of an hour or less. LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY radioteletype transmissions, which began originating from Saigon for the first time on 16 June, have also not been monitored since the 23d.

Vietnamese media contained several references to DRV delegations in South Vietnam, including a group of North Vietnamese writers who were said to have attended a two-day conference of "liberation writers" in Saigon which began on 17 June. A meeting of North and South Vietnamese social scientists was also reported to have taken place there on the same day. The media have noted recent visits to Danang by Hanoi municipal party and government officials, and to Quang Nam by officials from the DRV province of Thanh Hoa.

Security problems in South Vietnam continue to be reflected in the media, with Saigon radio noting that the administration was carrying out efforts to eradicate "organizations of the U.S.-puppet regime" which had refused to disband and were opposing the revolution. Both Saigon and Liberation Radio reported that security cadres were "building a network of security organizations," and that "most of the wards and subwards" were organizing security cells, "red flag" cells, and armed self defense cells to assist security forces.

HANOI PAPER SCORES KISSINGER SPEECH ON U.S. ASIAN POLICIES

The 21 June NHAN DAN commentary on Secretary Kissinger's 18 June speech before the Japan Society in New York sharply objected to the Secretary's

criticism of Vietnam and Cambodia, denouncing him for "slandering" the Vietnamese people with "distorted allegations" about the situation in Indochina. While alluding to Kissinger's remarks on the lessons the United States had learned from its Indochina experience, the paper stressed his admonition that the lessons should be applied carefully and charged that "the United States will not renounce its policy of interference in other Asian countries because of its debacle in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos."

The commentary treated in a similar negative manner the Secretary's remarks on relations with Vietnam and Cambodia. NHAN DAN did not quote Kissinger's affirmation with regard to the new regimes in Asia--that "we are prepared to look to the future." However, the commentary did denounce his remarks surrounding that declaration, rejecting his criticism of the regimes for flouting international agreements and standards and protesting his statement that the U.S. attitude toward them would be influenced by their conduct toward their neighbors and their attitude toward the United States.

NHAN DAN charged that Washington was attempting to distort the situation and "drive a wedge" between the Vietnamese people and the people of other countries. It maintained in this regard that "the solidarity and friendly cooperation between the three peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos are very close, everlasting and unbreakable," and that "relations between Vietnam and Thailand and other countries in Southeast Asia are also being improved."

On the question of Vietnam's policy toward the United States, the commentary repeated Hanoi's stock demands that the United States abide by articles of the Paris agreement guaranteeing U.S. nonintervention and Vietnamese sovereignty, independence, and unity, and that the United States "strictly implement" Article 21 on its "obligation" to assist in postwar reconstruction. It went on to state that "on this basis" DRV-U.S. relations could be normalized and "other pending problems" settled, thus holding out no immediate prospect for DRV cooperation in obtaining information on U.S. personnel missing in action. The commentary did not repeat DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's statement in his report to the North Vietnamese National Assembly on 4 June that the DRV Government was "ready to discuss with the U.S. Government" the questions of U.S. aid, the search for the Americans missing in action, and the exhumation and repatriation of the remains of Americans killed in the war.*

* Trinh's report to the Assembly is discussed in the TRENDS of 11 June 1975, pages 6-8.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160002-2

- 8 -

C O R R E C T I O N

The TRENDS of 18 June 1975 erroneously stated on page 17 that monitored Hanoi media had failed to mention the 4 June PRG Council of Ministers meeting. A recheck of monitors' program summaries indicates that the PRG Council meeting was in fact reported by Hanoi broadcasts in Vietnamese on 5 and 7 June.

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160002-2

- 9 -

MIDDLE EAST

USSR SPECULATES ON OUTCOME OF U.S. TALKS WITH ARABS, ISRAEL

Moscow continues to speculate inconclusively on the possible outcome of the United States' Mideast policy review and the prospects for a new Israeli-Egyptian accord, viewing such a "partial settlement" with skepticism. While continuing to regard renewed step-by-step negotiating approaches with distaste, Moscow seems to have placed its call for renewal of the Geneva conference on the back burner. The Israeli report that the Labor Party had agreed on a "map"--or at least on negotiating positions--for Israel's post-settlement borders drew predictable Soviet criticism of Tel Aviv's "annexationist" stance and predictions that the Arabs would refuse to negotiate on Israel's terms. Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam's talks in Washington on 20 June drew only minimal TASS reportage. Boris Ponomarev, CPSU secretary and Politburo candidate member heading a CPSU delegation to Damascus, may well have sought to obtain a first-hand assessment of Khaddam's talks--the delegation's visit, originally announced by Damascus as scheduled for only four days, lasted from 20 to 25 June, the day after Khaddam's return to Damascus.

DIPLOMATIC PROSPECTS

Soviet commentators have summed up recent U.S. diplomatic activity vis-a-vis the Middle East in stock terms, with TASS General Director L. Zamyatin, for example, asserting on the 20th that President Ford's talks with as-Sadat in Salzburg and with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in Washington concerned a "limited agreement, not settlement of the Middle East problem as a whole." In the most wide-ranging discussion of recent developments, Mideast specialist Igor Belyayev, on Moscow radio's 22 June roundtable program, explored various interpretations of peace prospects following President Ford's meetings with as-Sadat and Rabin. One approach, he said, was the possible resumption of "shuttle diplomacy," either by Secretary Kissinger or some other diplomat. He cited recent remarks by Egyptian Vice President Mubarak to convey the impression that Cairo regarded this as an unlikely possibility.

Turning to the U.S. policy reappraisal, Belyayev remarked that it was "still unclear" how this policy would be formulated. Possibly inadvertently, he misquoted President Ford's 9 June news conference statement that possible options were a resumption of the step-by-step negotiations, or reconvening of the Geneva conference, or "a step-by-step process under the Geneva umbrella." Belyayev rendered this as

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

25 JUNE 1975

- 10 -

"using the stage-by-stage solution and a total solution as one means" of solving the Mideast situation. He claimed that the importance of the Soviet position lay in the fact that it was firm and open, calling in "practical terms" for liberation of all Arab territory occupied in June 1967, insuring the Palestinians' national rights, and guaranteeing to all countries and peoples of the region, including Israel, that the area would not be troubled by new outbreaks of war.

ISRAELI Belyayev and other commentators have seized on reports
BORDERS that the Israeli Labor Party had agreed on a "map" of post-settlement borders to belabor Tel Aviv again for its "intransigence" and expansionism. Stressing that the "map" confirmed many of Israel's 1967 conquests, Belyayev noted that it proposed annexation of the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip, set the Jordan River as Israel's security line, and only left open for negotiation the question of sovereignty over the West Bank, Sharm ash-Shaykh, and the eastern shore strip along the Gulf of Aqaba. Belyayev did acknowledge that the Labor Party was proposing that the government support the map, which was not yet an official position, but he implied that this was only a formality, pointing out that the Labor Party was the "ruling party." He expressed doubt that the leaders of the Arab countries directly involved in military conflict with Israel "would be willing to negotiate on the basis of this new map."

TASS on the 20th called the "map of Israel's final borders" evidence of Israel's "insatiable appetite," noting that it would almost certainly become official policy. And TASS commentator Losev on the 20th drew attention to the fact that reports about the map coincided with Rabin's return from his visit to the United States, where he had sought continued military aid. Losev charged that U.S. aid had encouraged Israel to take "an even more intransigent position" on an Arab-Israeli settlement, and that Israel viewed another disengagement agreement with Israel merely as a means to consolidate its occupation of Arab land. In a 21 June article, PRAVDA's Glukhov called the map an "alarming signal" that Israel sought to preserve tension in the area.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

PONOMAREV IN SYRIA Moscow has provided little of substance in its coverage of the 20-25 June visit to Damascus by a CPSU delegation led by Boris Ponomarev.* The only Soviet reference thus far to Ponomarev's meeting with Syrian President al-Assad came in an Arabic-language commentary by A. Timoshkin on the 23d, which noted that they had had "a friendly conversation." Damascus radio accounts, not much more informative, said that al-Assad had been handed a message from Brezhnev during the three-hour meeting, which dealt with bilateral relations, the Middle East, and international questions. During the visit a CPSU-Ba'th Party "cooperation plan" for 1975-76 was signed, and the CPSU delegation held talks with the Syrian Communist Party.

Ponomarev also met with Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Executive Committee, according to reports by TASS and Cairo's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) on the 23d. TASS said they discussed "prospects for resolving the problems of the Palestinian Arab peoples within the framework of efforts to attain a lasting and just peace" in the Middle East, and that the Palestinians "highly appreciated" the Soviet positions. According to MENA's account, PLO spokesman Abu Mayzar claimed that Ponomarev had reaffirmed the Soviet Union's every support to the PLO "in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people"--an official recognition that the USSR has been reluctant to extend publicly. Moscow's first, and apparently only, formal public recognition of the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative" came in a low-level communique on the visit of a Soviet trade union delegation to Algeria in March this year. This may well have been at Algerian insistence: Algiers radio on 23 June reported still another Algerian-Soviet communique on the visit of a Soviet trade union delegation, which again said the two sides "stressed that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people." There is as yet no available Soviet report on this communique.

TALKS WITH CP DELEGATIONS Shortly before his Damascus visit for talks with the Syrian Ba'th Party, Ponomarev held talks in Moscow with a series of visiting Mideast communist party delegations. The most recent visitors, from the Iraqi CP, were reported by TASS on the 21st to have ended a two-week stay during which they had talks with unidentified Soviet participants. Ponomarev's

* Previously, Ponomarev led a delegation to Iraq for talks in November 1973; in July 1971 he was in Egypt for the 19th anniversary of the 23 July revolution and the Arab Socialist Union congress, and he held talks with the ASU in Cairo in December 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL
FBI'S TRENDS
25 JUNE 1975

- 12 -

meeting with a Lebanese CP delegation was reported by TASS on 15 June, and his talk with an Israeli CP delegation was reported on the 12th. Earlier, in mid-May, Ponomarev had received Jordanian CP First Secretary Fuad Nabbur, who was presented with a Friendship of the Peoples Order during his Moscow visit on the occasion of his 60th birthday. The Syrian CP, which also usually has talks with the CPSU about once a year, apparently has not sent a delegation to Moscow this year, but Ponomarev met with Syrian CP leaders during his just-completed visit to Damascus.

Such CPSU meetings with Mideast CP's do not normally seem to come in a cluster, but Ponomarev--and sometimes Suslov or Kirilenko or, rarely, Brezhnev--have held talks with the main Arab CP's in recent years on the average of once a year. Thus Iraqi CP talks were reported in October 1974, November 1973, and October 1972; Lebanese CP delegations were in Moscow in September and February 1974 and in June 1972; Syrian CP delegations met with CPSU officials in August 1974, October 1973, and July 1972. Israeli CP visitors apparently have been somewhat less frequent, but party secretary general Meir Vilner led delegations for talks in June 1973, December 1971, and June 1969. During the December 1971 visit Vilner met with Demichev; in 1969 he was received by Brezhnev, after attending the International communist conference in Moscow that month.

- 13 -

EAST EUROPE

ROMANIANS REGISTER SATISFACTION WITH RESULTS OF ZHIVKOV VISIT

Romania's Ceausescu has voiced strong satisfaction with the results of Bulgarian leader Zhivkov's 16-20 June official Bucharest visit, marked by the signing of a "joint declaration" which was noticeably accommodating toward Romanian positions on the independence of individual parties and states. Zhivkov's willingness to go part way toward the Romanian positions in the joint statement did not carry over to his own remarks, however, which reiterated customary orthodox Bulgarian views. The two Balkan neighbors also signed a number of important economic and scientific-technical agreements, including accords on coordination of five-year development plans, construction of a major powerplant on the Danube and transmission of electricity over Romanian territory from the Soviet Union to Bulgaria. At the conclusion of the visit Ceausescu characterized relations with the orthodox Sofia regime as a "model" for relations between socialist countries and further indicated his satisfaction by conveying "warm greetings from the bottom of my heart to our dear friend,odor Zhivkov." In another endorsement the Romanian party's Political Executive Committee hailed the visit "with particular warmth."

The joint declaration published in SCINTEIA on the 21st was strong on the theme of independence and meager on communist unity language, omitting entirely the customary orthodox call for greater bloc "unity and cohesion," which Bucharest on occasion has accepted in communiques with bloc countries. In a departure from recent practice the declaration--obviously at Romanian instigation--invoked the 1970 friendship treaty between the two countries to stress that the generally accepted principles of relations between countries with different social systems apply also to relations between bloc parties and states. Thus, the Bucharest declaration employed standard communist jargon in characterizing relations between Romania and Bulgaria as based on "Marxism-Leninism, socialist internationalism and the treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" but went on to add "and the principles of national sovereignty and independence, equality of rights, comradely assistance, noninterference in domestic affairs and mutual advantage" Although these principles are spelled out in the Bulgarian-Romanian friendship treaty and in Romania's treaties with other bloc countries, communiques between bloc countries normally cite these principles only in the section dealing with general international relations.

- 14 -

The action on communist party relations also suggested Bulgarian concessions to Romanian sensitivities. Thus, the declaration stated that the two parties attach "great significance" to bilateral and multilateral cooperation based not only on the principles of "Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, solidarity, comradely assistance and mutual support" but also on the principles of "independence, equality of rights and noninterference in domestic affairs." The two leaders routinely endorsed the proposed European communist party conference by "positively" assenting the preparatory work thus far and pledging to work for the unity of the "participating" parties as well as of "all democratic and progressive forces . . . in Europe."

The declaration made little more than pro forma references to CEMA, in noting the importance of carrying out the complex program, and to the Warsaw Pact. Although the two leaders noted the Pact's "important role" and the need for cooperation among its members, their call for strengthening its defense capacity as long as NATO exists was coupled with a reiteration of the Pact's proposal for mutual dissolution of both organizations.

Zhivkov's effort to appear accommodating toward Romania in the joint declaration was balanced by remarks he delivered on the final day of the visit in which he strongly asserted orthodox positions. Thus he repeatedly called for greater "unity and cohesion" within the bloc, emphasizing Sofia's interest in greater economic integration within CEMA and in the "indissoluble unity" of the Warsaw Pact. The Bulgarian leader also repeated his earlier calls for a world communist party conference to follow the European party conference.

ROMANIAN DIPLOMATIC AGREEMENTS In recent months Ceausescu has shown strong interest in publicizing diplomatic agreements and statements emphasizing Romanian independence. In addition to "solemn declarations" signed with numerous nonaligned and Western countries, recent accords have included:

+ A joint communique on Foreign Minister Macovescu's 9-13 December 1974 visit to the Soviet Union, in which Moscow agreed to the Romanian language stating principles of relations between states are to be based on "equal rights, the observance of independence, national sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs, mutual advantage, and refraining from the use of force and threat of force."

+ A "treaty of friendship and cooperation" with a non-Warsaw Pact communist state after the 22-26 May visit of the DPRK's Kim Il-song; Moscow signed a "treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" with the DPRK in 1961.

CONFIDENTIAL

FILES TRENDS
23 JUNE 1979

- 15 -

+ An unprecedented "treaty of friendship and cooperation" with a NATO member after Portuguese President Costa Gomes' 13-15 June visit.

Classified by 000073

CONFIDENTIAL

25 JUNE 1975

- 16 -

LATIN AMERICA

COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE STRESSES "FIRM UNITY," ATTACKS PRC

The declaration issued by the 9-13 June conference of Latin American communist parties in Havana--the first such pan-Latin gathering since 1964--indicated that relations between Castro and the Latin parties have shifted from the open confrontation of the late 1950's to renewed accommodation. Both Havana radio and TASS pointed out that the conference--in what TASS, but not Havana, identified as an "official communique"--had stressed the "firm unity" of the parties. The major conference document, a declaration on the situation in Latin America, while praising the "great achievements" of the Cuban revolution under Castro's "firm, bold and correct leadership," asserted that the Latin revolutionary movement must use "the most diverse" forms and methods of struggle according to the different conditions in each country.

Conference attendance was apparently confined to the Western hemisphere, Havana and TASS listing 24 Latin participants and noting that the Canadian and U.S. communist parties sent delegations as observers; no mention was made of any Soviet participation.

In reporting the conference declaration, TASS said it pointed out that Cuba had demonstrated it was possible to take the road of socialist construction on the American continent. TASS predictably highlighted the declaration's "resolute condemnation" of PRC policy, ranging from Peking's "overtures to imperialism" to its "slander of the USSR." TASS also noted that the conference "came out" for an international conference of communist and workers parties, a point not mentioned thus far in Cuban reportage. Havana radio, which did not announce the holding of the conference until a day after its conclusion, is now in the process of broadcasting the declaration text in installments.

LATIN CP UNITY The major conference document--the declaration on "Latin America in struggle against imperialism, for national independence, democracy, the well-being of the peoples, for peace and socialism"--reflects the rapprochement between Cuba and the other parties achieved in the past few years. In the mid- and late-1960's Castro assailed most of the orthodox parties at one time or another and often backed guerrilla groups which clashed

25 JUNE 1975

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160002-2

- 17 -

with the party leadership in various Latin countries.* But Cuba has gradually shifted from its single-minded insistence on armed struggle toward favoring "diverse paths" to socialism, and has recognized the vanguard role played by the communist parties. The conference declaration, judging by Havana's broadcast summary version, in effect emphasized the vanguard role in noting that the "working class must have the leading role" and that the communists were "linked to the masses in the labor movement" and therefore "understand their immediate needs." The document also called for contributions by other forces in stating that "the participation of the broadest social sectors" was essential. The declaration said that the Latin revolutionary movement must use the most diverse forms and methods of struggle, "correctly adapting its location and timing according to the different conditions in each country."

According to Havana's summary, the declaration placed the major blame for the region's poverty and failure to attain true independence on "the brutal exploitation by the U.S. imperialists." Praising the "magnificent example" of the Cuban people, whom the imperialists could not crush, and noting favorable developments in certain other countries, the CP declaration concluded that historic circumstances favored Latin America's "second and definitive struggle for independence," which would be achieved through socialism.

ATTACK ON PRC,
WARNING TO OPEC

The conference declaration digressed from its general preoccupation with Latin affairs to blast Peking's "flirtation" with imperialism--including the PRC's "justification" of NATO and its "shameless collusion" with the Chilean junta--and claimed that the Chinese party leadership "slandered the USSR with the same skill as the worst spokesmen for international reactionaries." The harsh language, even given the pro-Soviet orientation of the parties, seems to point up the poor state of Sino-Cuban relations since at least 1973, when Castro's openly pro-Soviet stance at the nonaligned conference in Algiers met with disfavor in Peking.**

* Castro's vitriolic attacks on the traditional parties before and during the Havana-based Latin American Solidarity Organization conference in 1967 are discussed in the TRENDS of 17 August 1967, pages 4-13.

** NCNA's critical handling of Castro's speech defending the Soviet Union at the Algiers conference is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 September 1973, pages 8-9.

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160002-2

- 18 -

According to Havana's summary, regarding the only other extracontinental issues discussed, the document praised the "great Vietnamese victory" and deplored "imperialist maneuvers" against oil-producing countries. Although the conference declaration apparently made no other mention of the oil question, a PRENSA LATINA dispatch of 16 June reported that the conference had issued a statement "warning" that OPEC must "express firm economic solidarity" with the underdeveloped world if the oil producers expect to have the continued backing of the non-oil-producing, underdeveloped countries. PRENSA LATINA also reported that the conference had approved Castro's proposal that surplus income obtained from petroleum price increases should be invested in underdeveloped countries or made available to them through credit arrangements, a suggestion Castro has often made.

- 19 -

U S S R

MAZUROV, KIRILENKO AGAIN DIVERGE ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES

Divergent viewpoints on Soviet investment priorities for heavy industry and consumer goods were again expressed in June speeches for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet election campaign by CPSU Central Committee Secretary Kirilenko and First Deputy Premier Mazurov, both of whom concentrate their activities on industry. Kirilenko favored more investment for heavy industry, and Mazurov more for consumer goods. This year, in contrast with the 1974 election speeches, Mazurov appeared on the defensive while Kirilenko confidently cited Central Committee support for his position, apparently reflecting the December 1974 CPSU plenum approval of higher growth rates for producer goods and lower rates for consumer goods. Brezhnev and Kosygin, who appeared to lead the conflicting sides during the 1974 debate,* have not recently sided with either sector publicly.

Last year, in the June 1974 USSR Supreme Soviet election speeches, Mazurov had clearly urged more investment in construction of consumer goods capacity, while Kirilenko had stressed the enormous amount already invested in new consumer goods capacity. According to the 8 June 1974 PRAVDA, Mazurov, in discussing construction, declared that "we should adopt special measures to speed construction and expansion of enterprises producing consumer goods" and he also stated that the party would continue to stress fuller satisfaction of the material demands of the public. Four days later, as reported in the 12 June 1974 PRAVDA, Kirilenko "stressed that one of the characteristics of present-day economic development is that almost half of all newly constructed large projects are enterprises of the light and food industries," which "has permitted a significant increase in output of consumer goods."

In this year's election speech Kirilenko appeared on the offensive, declaring, according to the 11 June 1975 LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA version, that "the Central Committee considers it necessary for machine building to develop at higher rates" and "it is hardly necessary to prove how important it is" to achieve a level of development "which will more fully satisfy the growing needs for new, improved and more productive machines" He added that 800 enterprises of the light and food industries had already been built during the current five-year plan, permitting a "noticeable increase in production of consumer goods."

* For background on evidence of the positions of Brezhnev and Kosygin on priorities, see the TRENDS Supplement "Soviet Factions Renew Debates over Economic Priorities," 23 May 1975.

Mazurov, on the defensive in his current election speech, only urged "constant attention" for the consumer goods industry and public services and argued, according to the 5 June 1975 LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA version, that at the present stage of economic development one could develop heavy industry and strengthen defense while also "simultaneously significantly raising the people's welfare."

Mazurov received little encouragement from past consumer goods advocates Podgornyy and Kosygin in their own election speeches this year. Podgornyy, who back in 1965 had also argued that it was time for consumer goods to grow along with heavy industry and defense, declared this year that "no society can consume more than it produces, and the further growth of the people's welfare will depend directly on the increase in the economic might of our country and on the labor participation of each and all." Kosygin, who as recently as November 1973 had insisted on higher growth rates for consumer goods than for producer goods, this year made a statement similar to Podgornyy's, while Brezhnev did not even address economic issues.

Brezhnev, despite his long association with heavy industry, in 1974 had offered some encouragement for the consumer goods industry. In his June 1974 election speech he had declared the slow growth of the light and food industries unsatisfactory, but he did not call for more investment to help these branches. In his 11 October 1974 Kishinev speech Brezhnev called for a deemphasis on new construction in general and, as if aiming at both sides, he complained of poor return on investment "both in the work of heavy industry and in production of consumer goods."

Nevertheless, Brezhnev appears to have sided with his old heavy industry colleagues in deciding where new investments should go. Addressing the Council of Ministers chaired by Kosygin in early October, he apparently laid new priority on heavy industry: the council adopted a decision listing heavy industry first, then agriculture, and finally, consumer goods. Further, when the Central Committee met in December it approved raising the growth rates for producer goods and lowering those for consumer goods. The plenum also produced two new slogans reemphasizing heavy industry: on the need for further development of heavy industry--"the backbone of our economy"--and on the "two main, basic levers" to raise production--"speeding of scientific-technical progress and improvement of the mechanism and methods of management." (At the December 1973 plenum the "two pillars" of economic policy had been defined as "improvement of leadership of the economy" and "mobilization of the widest masses of workers" in socialist competition.)

The rationale for the decision to raise growth rates for heavy industry while letting consumer goods rates slip was provided by Kirilenko in a March KOMMUNIST article and by Deputy Premier N.A. Tikhonov in a 13 May 1975 TRUD article. Discussing the two new levers in detail, Kirilenko stressed that to "speed scientific-technical progress" as called for by the December plenum, machine building production must be stepped up: ". . . The CPSU Central Committee clearly sees that the economy's need for modern highly productive machinery is not being fully satisfied, and that to resolve the tasks of further fast development of our economy and to speed technical progress in all spheres of economic activity and insure on this basis significant growth of labor productivity, we must develop machine building production at still higher rates and raise its technical level." He added that "the party has set this task before our central economic organs" and "much attention should be given" to this in the new five-year plan. He again mentioned how much had been done in recent years to develop consumer goods and services.

In his article, Tikhonov, a ferrous metallurgy specialist and old colleague of Kirilenko and Brezhnev from Dnepropetrovsk, declared that Lenin "repeatedly stressed that only the development of heavy industry can insure the necessary growth of all other branches--light industry and agriculture--and on this basis raising of the material welfare of the workers." Further, argued Tikhonov, "at the present stage, the role of heavy industry. . . not only does not diminish but even grows," and higher growth rates for consumer goods and agriculture should follow from an expanded industrial base and speeded scientific-technical progress.

- 22 -

NOTES

PYONGYANG ON SCHLESINGER: A 24 June DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement has condemned U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger's comments at a 20 June press conference about the U.S. nuclear option in Korea as an "open aggressive outburst." The statement labeled the comments "nuclear blackmail" and stated that the attempt to "frighten" the Korean people with nuclear weapons only demonstrated U.S. "vulnerability." The statement said without elaboration that the United States was reiterating "daily" that it would keep its forces in South Korea, abide by its commitments to the ROK, and "if necessary, will carry out a sweeping military intervention." The foreign ministry spokesman repeated standard Pyongyang charges that the United States planned to reinforce its military position and launch a war against the North, claiming such plans were part of a "post-Vietnam war strategy." Rejecting accusations that there was a threat of invasion from the North, the statement asserted that the "DPRK government has already made it clear many times that it has no intention of invading the South."

PEKING ON USSR-JAPAN: A 21 June Peking NCNA correspondent's article has directly criticized the Soviet "statement to the government of Japan" carried by TASS on 18 June, which had cautioned Japan against accepting an "anti-hegemony" clause in the proposed Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship. The statement had also accused China of trying to draw Japan into her "orbit." The NCNA correspondent stressed that Moscow's opposition to the hegemony clause exposed Soviet hegemonic ambitions and quoted a Japanese source as saying that "the Soviet action will have an exactly opposite effect" to that intended. Other Peking coverage has been limited to reporting unfavorable Japanese reaction to the statement. While Moscow media have publicized the Soviet statement in broadcasts to Japan and to other foreign audiences as well as in TASS English and Russian transmissions, the statement has not been published in the Soviet press--an unusual omission that adds to the statement's already ambiguous authority.

PRC-U.S.-TAIWAN: Peking's treatment of the Taiwan issue in this year's 25 June PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY joint editorial marking the 25th anniversary of the start of the Korean war and of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan is consistent with its markedly low-key, sanguine view of the issue in last year's PEOPLE'S DAILY anniversary editorial. The 1974 editorial, in the course of duly reaffirming Chinese determination to liberate Taiwan, failed to repeat past years' references to Chinese determination to eliminate "foreign interference" and to tolerate no meddling by "any foreign country" in Taiwan. This year Peking said that Taiwan's liberation "brooks no interference from anyone" and it

carefully avoided, like last year, any reference to "foreign" interference. Unlike last year's editorial, Peking this time referred to "schemes of creating two Chinas," but expressed confidence they are all "doomed to failure."

PEKING SOUTH ASIA BROADCASTS: Peking radio announced on 21 June that it would initiate two half-hour programs daily in the Nepalese language beginning 25 June, marking the latest step in China's recent efforts to broaden its propaganda capabilities in South Asia. Since 1968 Peking radio has added new international service in only five languages, three of these South Asian languages. Thus, aside from the new Asian programs in Nepalese, Peking radio began last January a daily half-hour program in Sinhalese beamed to Sri Lanka, and in July 1973 started broadcasting two half-hour programs daily in Pushtu for Afghanistan. The other Peking services added since 1968 were broadcasts in Bulgarian, and in Quechua to Peru.

PHNOM PENH RADIO ON SIHANOUK: Phnom Penh radio made its first reference to Prince Norodom Sihanouk in over a month in a brief report on the visit by RGNU Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak to Albania, Yugoslavia, and Africa. The report, contained in the radio's "Weekly International News Feature" broadcast on 21 June, noted that Sarin Chhak conveyed to the leaders of each country he visited a message of gratitude for past support from Sihanouk as "Samdech Chief of State and NUFC Chairman." Phnom Penh radio's last known reference to Sihanouk was in an 11 May commentary which noted that Sihanouk, RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth, and Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan had received a message of congratulations from Chinese leaders on the communist victory in Cambodia. In recent weeks Phnom Penh broadcasts have been devoted mainly to reports on domestic developments which would not normally include references to Sihanouk; however, some opportunities to publicize his activities were ignored. Thus, for example, the radio failed to report both Sihanouk's 16 May cable to Algerian President Boumediene appealing for Third World support and his 17 May cable of support to Khieu Samphan during the Mayaguez incident, both of which were carried by NCNA. Phnom Penh thus far has also ignored Sihanouk's activities in North Korea since his arrival there on 19 May.

- 1 -

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 16 - 22 JUNE 1975

<u>Moscow (2411 items)</u>			<u>Peking (811 items)</u>		
Union Republic Supreme	(26%)	10%	Japan	(2%)	5%
Soviet Elections			[USSR Reaction to	(1%)	4%]
[Brezhnev Speech	(7%)	3%]	PRC-Japan Treaty		
China	(5%)	5%	Negotiations		
Italian Elections	(--)	4%	Albanian Economic	(--)	4%
Brezhnev Meeting with	(--)	2%	Delegation in PRC		
GDR First Secretary			USSR	(2%)	3%
Honecker			India	(--)	3%
Ponomarev in Syria	(--)	2%	Indochina	(5%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.